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FEDERALISM AND THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION: THE




The fascination most lawyers find in procedure and process is the
result of the opportunity it seems to provide for the evasion of funda-
mental issues of substance. Thus, even decisions as far-reaching as
enunciations of constitutional doctrine by members of the Supreme
Court of the United States are often read as attempts by the Court
to govern the process by which actions have been taken rather than
the substantive results of those actions. Over time however, the sig-
nificance of such substantive results emerges from the pattern of
decisions. And attempts to legitimate those results inevitably involve
characterizations both of the judicial process in terms of which they
were originally rationalized, and the federal polity on which they were
imposed.'
It was the substantive consequences of the process defined by the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores2 that informed
Justice Blackmun's dissent:
3
* The first draft of Part IV of this article and of the concluding paragraph was
prepared by Professor LaRue; the first draft of the rest of the article was prepared by
Professor Deutsch.
** Professor of Law, Yale University, B. A., Yale University (1955); M.A. Clare
College, Cambridge (1963); LL.B., Ph.D., Yale University (1962).
*** Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University, A.B. Washington & Lee
University (1959); LL.B. Harvard University (1962).
1 See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2 421 U.S. 723, 770 (1975).
Joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
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Perhaps it is true that more cases that come within the
Birnbaum doctrine can be properly proved than those that fall
outside it. But this is no reason for denying standing to sue to
plaintiffs, such as the one in this case, who allegedly are in-
jured by novel forms of manipulation. We should be wary
about heeding the seductive call of expediency and about sub-
stituting convenience and ease of processing for the more diffi-
cult task of separating the genuine claim from the unfounded
one.
The Birnbaum opinion had confined itself largely to textual
analysis, concluding that:
Section 16(b) . . . expressly gave the corporate issuer or its
stockholders a right of action against corporate insiders using
their position to profit in the sale or exchange of corporate
securities. The absence of a similar provision in Section 10(b)
strenghtens the conclusion that that section was directed
solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice
usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather
than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded
purchaser or seller.
5
The holding about which the majority and dissent in Blue Chip
disagreed was that "[W]e are of the opinion that Birnbaum was
rightly decided, and that it bars respondent from maintaining this
suit under Rule 10b-5." 6 The question raised by the dissent's analysis
is the extent to which a judicial holding that standing exists under a
given statutory provision can be governed by factors other than tex-
tual interpretation. Whatever one's views on that issue, it is at least
clear that what Blue Chip means is something that will be puzzled
over by the federal Courts of Appeals, who can read the opinion either
as mandating a return to the standing requirements delineated in the
Birnbaum holding, or simply as drawing to a halt the expansion of
10b-5 federal jurisdiction, in the sense that the Birnbaum rationale
should not further be eroded. Thus, at the time Blue Chip was de-
cided, the status of Birnbaum in the Circuit which had rendered that
decision was that "although some courts have held that a private
421 U.S. 723, 761, 770 (1975).
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
421 U.S. at 731.
7 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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party not a purchaser or seller, seeking injunctive relief, may have
standing to assert a § 10(b) violation ... and another has suggested
the elimination of the purchaser-seller requirement. . . it is still the
rule in this circuit that the requirement be satisfied in a suit for
damages." 8
Self-consciousness concerning this discretion necessarily left to
the lower federal and stite judiciaries by the processes of law distin-
guishes, to a significant degree, the work of the Warren and Burger
Courts. Justice Rehnquist, the author of Blue Chip, gave voice to this
self-consciousness when he specially concurred in Justice Douglas'
opinion for a unanimous Court in Lehman Brothers v. Schein.' Al-
though he agreed with the Court's statement that "use of state court
certification procedures by federal courts 'does, of course, in the long
run save time, energy and resources and helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism', 0 . . . a sensible respect for the experience and
competence of the various integral parts of the federal judicial- system
suggests that we go slowly in telling the courts of appeals or the
district courts how to go about deciding cases where federal jurisdic-
tion is based on diversity of citizenship, cases which they see and
decide far more often than we do,""1 and that "in a purely diversity
case such as this one, the use of such a [certification] procedure is
more a question of considerable discretion of the federal court in
going about the decisionmaking process than it is a question of a
choice trenching upon the fundamentals of our federal-state juris-
prudence."'
2
The issue ordered certified to the Supreme Court of Florida in
Lehman Brothers was whether Florida law would extend the decision
of the Court of Appeals of New York in Diamond v. Oreamuno.3
Diamond had held corporate officers and directors accountable to
their corporation for gains realized by them as a result of their use of
material inside information in transactions in the corporate stock,
and the question was whether that holding would be extended to a
situation involving investors who sold stock on the basis of inside
information provided by a stockbroker, who in turn had received the
information from a corporate officer. In Schein v. Chasen,'4 a panel of
Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
416 U.S. 386 (1974).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
22 Id. at 394.
3 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
11 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
district court dismissing plaintiffs stockholder derivative suit. The
Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the dissent in the Court of
Appeals, and the case was accordingly dismissed.'5
Given Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Lehman Brothers of the
significance of the certification procedure, it should be noted that, in
Diamond v. Oreamuno itself, the New York Court of Appeals, holding
that "[ain examination of the Federal regulatory scheme refutes the
contention that it was designed to establish any particular remedy as
exclusive,"' 6 rejected an argument based upon "our federal-state jur-
isprudence":
The defendants recognize that the conduct charged against
them directly contravened the policy embodied in the Securi-
ties Exchange Act but, they maintain, the Federal legislation
constitutes a comprehensive and carefully wrought plan for
dehling with the abuse of inside information and that allowing
a derivative action to be maintained under State law would
interfere with the Federal scheme. Moreover, they urge, the
existence of dual Federal and State remedies for the same act
would create the possibility of double liability. 7
It should also be noted that the transaction unsuccessfully at-
tacked in the Birnbaum litigation was held to create personal liability
in Perlman v. Feldman. The Perlman theory was that the corporate
power transferred by the sale of the stock in the circumstances pre-
sented constituted a corporate asset, and when the question arose as
to the percentage of outstanding stock whose sale would constitute a
corporate asset, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote
three opinions which agreed only that a trial should be held by the
District Court. In his opinion, Judge Friendly specifically cited to the
Florida certification procedure in lamenting the fact that "[h]ere we
are forced to decide a question of New York law, of enormous import-
ance to all New York corporations and their stockholders, on which
there is hardly enough New York authority for a really informed
prediction what the New York Court of Appeals would decide on the
facts here presented . . .yet too much for us to have the freedom
used to good effect in Perlman v. Feldman."''
,1 Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom,
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
" 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1969).
17 Id.
, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952, (1955).
" Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1962).
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II
Recent securities regulation decisions by the Burger Court show
self-consciousness, not only about the consequences of procedure, but
also about the legal consequences of a federal polity. In Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green,2" the Supreme Court decided that minority
shareholders, dissatisfied with the terms of a merger consummated
in accordance with statutory Delaware law, were restricted to the
appraisal remedy provided by the state law in the absence of allega-
tions of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure. Justice Brennan dis-
sented on the basis adopted by the panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals: that a Rule 10b-5 claim was stated by allegations that the
majority was effecting a merger without any justifiable business pur-
pose and that the proposed price to be paid for the shares in the
merger transaction was substantially lower than a price reflecting the
appraised value of the physical assets.2 '
Justice Stevens refused to join Part IV of the court's opinion be-
cause of the danger that it could be read as extending the holdings
in Blue Chip, which he noted he believed to be "incorrectly decided",
although he was not a member of the Court at the time the decision
was rendered, and Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc." from which
he had dissented. 23 Justice Blackmun agreed that Part IV was
"unnecessary for the decision in the instant case" and noted that he
regarded it as "exacerbating the concerns I express in my dissents in
Blue Chip and in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215
(1976) .",24
Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion, noted both that "the Court
repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the
[Securities Exchange] as implementing a 'philosophy of full
disclosure,' "21 and that "[i]n addition to posing a 'danger of vexa-
tious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of
plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5,' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975), [the proposed] extension of the
federal securities laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere with
state corporate law. ' 26 Its conclusion was that "[t]here may well be
, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
" Id. at 1304.
" 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
= 97 S. Ct. at 1304 (1977) (joined by Mr. Justice Brennan).
2J Id.
'2 Id. at 1303.
26 Id.
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a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such
as those challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not
be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b). .. ."
The law review article cited in the footnote to this conclusion
argued for federal legislation on the following basis:
Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a system
contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards.
This unhappy state of affairs, stemming in great part from the
movement toward the least common denominator, Delaware,
seems to be developing on both the legislative and judicial
fronts. In the management of corporate affairs, state statutory
and case law has always been supreme, with federal intrusion
limited to the field of securities regulation. Perhaps now is the
time to reconsider the federal role.2
The argument, however, is far from conclusive. As the issue facing
the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno demon-
strates,29 federal legislation runs the substantial risk of itself becom-
ing the lowest common denominator, or, as Schein v. Chasen demon-
strates,"0 adding further complications to the possibility inherent in
any federal system of divergent results being reached by different
authorities faced with the same or similar situations. More generally,
it is the overriding significance of a federal system that it represents
a political structure that makes it possible for equally important but
potentially contradictory human needs, such as individuality and
solidarity or diversity and unity, to be given expression. In the United
States, the federal system fulfills this function because the personal
status on which it rests is perceived by any given individual as a
formality based on facts like residence that are easily changed in a
mobile society. Thus, although in legal terms the designation of a
given state citizenship permits the ascribing judicial authority to
determine which law to apply, the very fact that the ascription serves
so technical a function assures that the person whose status is at issue
is self-consciously aware of the formal nature of the designation.
As in Blue Chip, Justice Blackmun dissented 21 from the Court's
- Id., at 1304.
2 Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.
J. 663, 663 (1974).
See text accompanying note 16 supra.
See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
' Joined by Mr. Justice Brennan.
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decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder2 on the basis that too much
importance was being assigned to technical aspects of the legal pro-
cess, that:
Once again-see Blue Chip . . .- the Court interprets
§ 10(b) . ..restrictively and narrowly and thereby stultifies
recovery for the victim. This time the Court does so by confin-
ing. . . the Rule to situations where the defendant has "scien-
ter" . . . . Sheer negligence, the Court says. . . was not con-
templated . . . by Congress and the Commission.3
[But] surely the question whether negligent conduct vio-
lates the Rule should not depend upon the plaintiffs identity.
If negligence is a violation factor when the SEC sues, it must
be a violation factor when a private party sues.4
The importance of "scienter" in the interaction between govern-
ment and the individual in our federal system was perhaps most
strikingly expressed by the dissent35 in Wainwright v. Sykes.'6 The
dissent noted that "over the course of the last decade, the deliberate
bypass standard announced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-439
(1963), has played a central role in efforts by the federal judiciary to
accommodate the constitutional rights of the individual with the
States' interest in the integrity of their judicial procedural regimes,"
and also defined the operational significance of that standard: "Fay
recognized that if one 'understandingly and knowingly forewent the
privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical or any other reasons that can fairly be
described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is
open to the federal court on the habeas to deny him all relief. ..
372 U.S. at 439. '38
The need for such a standard, given the drives for both individual-
ity and solidarity, is recognized in Freudian terms in the concept of
"superego," which in lay terms is known as "conscience". What the
description of this concept makes clear is that the rules of the game
in terms of which individual success is measured are simultaneously
perceived as the rules defining the behavior of the group of which the
individual regards himself a member:
- 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976).
3 Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 217-18.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall.
31 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
7 Id. at 2513.
11 Id. at 2514.
806 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
the representative . . . of every moral restriction ...
the vehicle of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgments
of value which have propagated themselves . . . from genera-
tion to generation.
'3 9
Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past, the
tradition of the race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies
of the superego, and yields only slowly to the influences of the
present and to new changes; and so long as it operates through
the superego it plays a powerful part in human life, indepen-
dently of economic conditions."
It is this duality that permits law to be perceived both as a norm
whose existence everyone must respect, and as a constraint which the
skillful will successfully manipulate to their individual advantage.
Because of this disparity between the perception of law as a social
and individual phenomenon, furthermore, it seems necessary both
that knowing violations of the rules not be permitted, and that the
group be permitted to exact penalties only from players who were
aware of the existence of the rules.
In the area of corporate law, the fact of this duality in the defini-
tion of of the legal process has been reflected in 10b-5 litigation since
1965. In that year, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
after holding "[t]he proper test . . .['concerning the meaning of
"reliance" in a case of non-disclosure under Rule 10b-5' to be]
whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently
than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed
fact,"" carefully noted that such a test "substitut[ed] the individual
plaintiff for the reasonable man,"4 and denied recovery, seemingly
on the basis of plaintiffs status as "an experienced and successful
investor."43 As a result, while it may be true that the Supreme Court's
repeated description of "the 'fundamental purpose' of the [Securities
Exchange] Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure," '44
postulates an impersonal market in which the identity of any given
player is irrelevant, it is equally true that the question of the status
of that player in connection with the particular transaction being
11 S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, in 22 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 66-67 (J. Strachey
ed. 1964).
o Id. at 67.
' List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
42 Id.
Id. at 464.
" See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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reviewed has been regarded as a relevant consideration in determin-
ing liability under the Securities Exchange Act. 5
MI
Corporate law, moreover, must deal with the political as well as
the economic aspects of business activity. In systemic political terms,
the legislature expresses the human need for solidarity by prescribing
general rules applicable to all, 'and the judiciary, the human need for
individuality by ascertaining whether the rule should be applied to
the particular situation presented. Viewed in these terms, the argu-
ment advanced by the dissent46 in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc." in favor of permitting damages to be recovered can be summa-
rized as follows: the tender offers regulated by section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act are sufficiently like the proxy solicitations
regulated by section 14(a) of that same statute so that "the investor
who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare,"4 and who
represented the focus of the majority's concern, did not constitute a
status exempt from the rule applied by the Supreme Court's decision
in J.:. Case Co. v. Borak49 to section 14(a) suits.
As note 21 in the majority opinion puts it:
The dissent emphasizes that Borak involved a derivative
suit brought on behalf of the corporation, in addition to the
shareholder's direct cause of action. Since corporations were
not the primary beneficiaries of § 14(a)-the proxy provision
involved in Borak-the dissent concludes that Borak itself fails
to meet the "especial class" requirement articulated by our
subsequent decision in Cort v. Ash. . . . But this is a misread-
ing of Borak; there, the Court observed that deceptive proxy
solicitations violative of § 14(a) injure the corporation in the
following sense:
"The damage suffered results not from the deceit practiced
on [the individual shareholder] alone but rather from the
" See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), which stated that
"The diligence of the plaintiff in 10b-5 cases is judged subjectively," Id. at 1016, and
cited as an example "a jury instruction that imposed a duty of due diligence 'solely
under the peculiar circumstances of each case, including existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship . . .position in the industry, sophistication and expertise in the financial
community and knowledge of related proceedings.'" Id. (footnotes omitted).
" See note 23 supra.
47 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977).
11 See 97 S. Ct. 926, 942 (1977).
4, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group." 377 U.S., at
432 (emphasis supplied.)
The Borak Court was thus focusing on all stockhold-
ers-the owners of the corporation-as the beneficiaries of §
14(a). Stockholders as a class therefore plainly constituted the
'especial class' for which the proxy provisions were enacted.
This reading of Borak comports with the statement of the
question presented in that case:
"We consider only the question of whether § 27 of the Act
authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages
to a corporate stockholder with respect to a consummated
merger. . . ." Id. at 428 (emphasis supplied.)"
The majority, in other words, views section 14(a) as protecting
shareholders "as a class" in the sense that the misinformation about
which the proxy provision is concerned represents potential injury
to the corporation. Since the corporation cannot itself be injured,
however, what is being protected is the process in terms of which
corporate decisions are made. Given this goal, the individual share-
holder recovers damages, not because injury has been suffered in the
amount of the damages, but because he participates in the process.
As the majority views section 14(e), however, the shareholder is
seen, not as a participant in a process, but as the holder of a commod-
ity for which competitors are bidding. In that status, the shareholder
is assisted by the provisions of section 14(e) in that they endure "full
disclosure" of all relevant information concerning the value of those
shares of corporate stock. In particular terms, the majority found it
"likely . . . that shareholders may be prejudiced because some
tender offers may never be made if there is a possibility of massive
damage claims for what courts subsequently hold to be an actionable
violation of section 14(e)."51
It remains true, however, that section 14(e) in fact represents a
general rule enunciated by the legislature, and, as the dissent put it:
"I do not understand, [e]ven under the Court's interpretation of
Borak as protecting all shareholders . . . [the] holding that only
some Piper shareholders are protected-i.e., 'ordinary' shareholders
as opposed to holders of large blocks." 52 Consequently, it seems im-
portant to note that the majority was perfectly aware that, in another
situation, the fact of shareholding per se might well be sufficient to
97 S. Ct. 926, 944-45, n.21 (1977).
" Id. at 948 (footnote omitted).
52 97 S. Ct. 926, 955, 962 n.18.
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confer standing, and even explicitly raised the possibility that share-
holders suing under section 14(e) might not be subject to the
purchaser-seller requirement enunciated in Blue Chip.3
Indeed, given the crucial relevance of the meaning of Borak to the
question of the legitimacy of judicial interpretation of legislation in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., it is significant that, in justify-
ing his holding, the author of Blue Chip noted both that "[t]his
Court had no occasion to deal with the subject [of an implied right
of action under Rule 10b-5] . . . until . . . [there existed an] over-
whelming consensus of the district courts and courts of appeals that
such a cause of action did exist,"" and that the "growth [of that
private right of action] may be quite consistent with the congres-
sional enactment and with'the role of the federal judiciary in inter-
preting it, see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, but it would be disingenuous
to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law
with respect to Rule 10b-5"5 5 before summarizing the basis for his
conclusion that:
We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the elements
of a private cause of action for damages, the duty of the Judi-
cial Branch would be to administer the law which Congress
enacted; the judiciary may not circumscribe a right which
Congress has conferred because of any disagreement it might
have with Congress about the wisdom of creating so expansive
a liability. But as we have pointed out, we are not dealing here
with any private right created by the express language of §
10(b) or by Rule 10b-5. No language in either of those provi-
sions speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action
for their violation. However flexibly we may construe the lan-
guage of both provisions, nothing in such construction mili-
tates against the Birnbaum rule. We are dealing with a private
cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and
which will have to be judicially delimited one way or another
unless and until Congress addresses the question. Given the
peculiar blend of legislative, administrative, and judicial his-
tory which now surrounds Rule 10b-5, we believe that practical
factors to which we have adverted, and to which other courts
have referred, are entitled to a good deal of weight."
97 S. Ct. 926, 948 and n.25.
' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
Id. at 737.
Id. at 748-49.
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IV
What we hope our analysis of Piper has demonstrated is that the
Supreme Court possesses a valuable political asset in that its opin-
ions can be so written as to permit the inference that their holdings
might not be applied to future situations. The political processes in
which the Court is involved, however, derive not only from the sepa-
ration of branches at the national level, but also from the impact of
the Court's opinions on the power of state governments. Professor
Herbert Wechsler, the legal scholar who argued that the application
of neutral principles to the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education
57
demonstrated that the Supreme Court was, in fact, engaged in mak-
ing a substantive value choice,"0 also branded the Supreme Court
decision in Naim v. Naim" as "wholly without basis in the law.""0 It
is our contention that an analysis of the issues presented by the
factual situation before the Supreme Court in Naim v. Naim demon-
strates that Professor Wechsler's characterization of that decision
ignores the extent to which intersections among the legal and politi-
cal aspects of Supreme Court opinions are required by the necessary
impacts of those opinions. We believe that this case is worth discuss-
ing at length because it functions as a paradigm of the legal problems
of federalism.
The case of Naim v. Naim began in the trial court, known in
Virginia as the Circuit Court, of Portsmouth, Virginia. Mrs. Ruby
Elaine Naim filed suit against her husband, Mr. Ham Say Naim, to
dissolve their marriage. The trial court granted an annulment, and
Ham Say appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Ruby
Elaine did not file a brief in the case, but the Attorney General of
Virginia appeared as an amicus curiae.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, stating that the sole issue
before it was the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting misce-
genation, viewed the annulment as having been based on the grounds
that the marriage was unlawful." In its opinion, written in the inter-
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segre-
gation is not one of discrimination at all; its human and its constitutional dimensions
lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in some way on any groups or races that may be involved." Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. Rv. 1, 34 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Wechsler].
5, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
Wechsler, supra note 58, at 34.
, Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
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val between the first and second Brown decisions, the Virginia court
held that the anti-miscegenation statute was constitutional. Ham
Say Naim appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court stated two grounds in sending the case back to
the Virginia court because of inadequacy of the record." First, the
record did not show the relationship of the parties to Virginia .at the
time of the marriage and at the time of their first returning to Vir-
ginia. The second ground was the failure of the parties to bring to the
Court "all questions relevant to the disposition of the case." For these
two reasons, the Court concluded the case did not present the issue
of the validity of the anti-miscegenation statute in "clean cut and
concrete form." The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated the judgment
and remanded.
The Virginia court at this point dug in its heels. 3 To be blunt
about it, there was a refusal to comply with the Supreme Court's
mandate. In its opinion, the Virginia court stated that the constitu-
tionality of the statute was squarely presented and that the record
contained sufficient -facts to decide the case. Second, the Virginia
court said that it had no procedure for remanding the case to Ports-
mouth for additional fact finding. Accompanying its second order,
the United States Supreme Court issued a very brief per curiam
opinion. The full opinion reads:
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. The
motion to recall the mandate and to set the case down for oral
argument upon the merits, or, in the alternative, to recall and
amend the mandate is denied. The decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia of January 18, 1956, 197 Va. 734,
90 S.E. 2d 849, in response to our order of November 14, 1955,
350 U.S. 891, leaves the case devoid of a properly presented
federal question. 4
It is this second opinion that Wechsler judged to be outrageous.
Wechsler said:
I take no pride in knowing that in 1956 the Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal in a case in which Virginia nullified a
marriage on this ground [miscegenation], a case in which the
statute had been squarely challenged by the defendant, and
" 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
' 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197 Va. 734,
90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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the court after remanding once, dismissed per curiam on pro-
cedural grounds that I make bold to say are wholly without
basis in the law.65
The first thing that should be noted is, that Wechsler agreed with
the Virginia Court that the issue was squarely presented. He appar-
ently disagreed with the Supreme Court's statement that the parties
had failed to bring before the Court all questions relevant to the
disposition of the case. Nor has Professor Wechsler been alone in his
judgment that the issue of the anti-miscegenation statute was pro-
perly before the Court. All of the law review commentators have
agreed. The first commentary upon the case was in the Virginia Law
Review. " The student comment was about the first Virginia opin-
ion, 7 and consists of genteel criticisms. The student editors wonder
if there might be any authority for the proposition that interracial
marriages cause physical or mental harm. They point out that the
Virginia Supreme Court does not cite any scientific authority but
merely relies upon subjective assertions. The case note criticizes the
Virginia Supreme Court for this subjective approach to constitutional
adjudication and argues that there should be some scientific author-
ity, even if it be minority authority, in support of the legislative
action. In the absence of scientific authority, the editors state that
possible alternative grounds for upholding the statute would be to
inquire whether there was reasonable basis for determining that the
safety, morals or welfare of the community would be endangered by
interracial marriages. The comment does not go on to discuss what
the answer would be if one asked these questions, which admittedly
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not.
Discussing the issue of evasion of the Supreme Court's mandate,
the North Carolina Law Review noted that the Supreme Court could
have followed Martin v. Hunters Lessee" and bypassed the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals altogether, returning the case directly to
the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, or it could have recalled
the case and decided it on the merits. The comment concludes:
Since it chose to do neither, the court evidently did not wish
to decide the question involved at this time and refrained from
doing so by apparently exercising its discretion as to what
constitutes an adequate record."
Wechsler, supra note 58, at 46-47.
" 41 VA. L. REv. 861.
" See note 61 supra.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
34 N.C.L. Rv. 492, 495 (1956).
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The North Carolina editors apparently thought that there were no
limitations upon the Supreme Court's discretion and that the Court
had carte blanche to call a record adequate or not as it might be
pleased to do so.
The Notre Dame Law Review agreed that the basic question was
refusal of the state court to follow a mandate but the editors were far
more critical of the performance of the Supreme Court.
The cases wherein the Supreme Court's mandate has not been
followed present no apparent trend of legal thought. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly refused to call the state courts into
line, contrary to the spirit of the Martin case. It has preferred
to recognize as controlling the legal niceties which the state
courts have offered by way of explanation for their refusal to
follow the Court's mandates on remand. The significance of
the principle case lies in this seeming reluctance of the Su-
preme Court to deviate from this legalism."
The editors of the Harvard Law Review in their annual review of
the Supreme Court viewed the issue in the same way, but were more
non-committal. After a general assertion that racial discrimination
was not a major part of the docket in the 1955 term but that what
was interesting was avoidance of the racial issues, and after a
straight-forward description of the procedural events, the one' para-
graph analysis of Naim v. Naim wound up by saying "[b]y the
expedient of refusing to obey the Supreme Court's order to return the
case to the trial court for clarification of the facts, the Virginia court
had, at least temporarily, saved the state's miscegenation statute
from constitutional scrutiny.""
The annual survey of Virginia law in the Virginia Law Review did
not criticize either the Virginia Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court. The domestic relations section of the survey said
that the case had "attracted much publicity but did not actually
change existing law" and spoke of the Virginia Supreme Court's first
decision as "well documented." 2 Dean Ribble's constitutional law
section was more thorough in discussing the procedural matters.7 3 He
pointed out that the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in an' Ala-
bama felony conviction under the Alabama anti-miscegenation stat-
ute and that the Virginia opinion had discussed this case, he made
,0 31 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 714, 716-17 (1956).
7" The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. REv. 83, 104 (1956).
72 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 42 VA. L. RPv. 989, 1007 (1956).
" Id. at 1158-59.
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some comments about the inconclusiveness of the denial of certiorari,
and he discussed the remand procedures in this particular case. He
made no evaluation of either court's performance.
The first probiem that must be considered in analyzing the Naim
v.Naim dismissal is the relationship between the Supreme Court's
first and second opinions. The Supreme Court's opinion on the first
round of the case reads in full as follows:
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Virginia. Per Curiam:
The inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the
parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the
marriage in North Carolina and upon their return to Virginia,
and the failure of the parties to bring here all questions rele-
vant to the disposition of the case, prevents the constitutional
issue of the validity of the Virginia statute on miscegenation
tendered here being considered "in clean-cut and concrete
form, unclouded" by such problems. Rescue Army v. Munici-
pal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584. The judgment is vacated and the
case remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals in order that
the case may be returned to the Circuit Court of the City of
Portsmouth for action not inconsistent with this opinion.74
The second opinion stated that the Virginia court's action on re-
mand "leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal ques-
tion."75 There are two ways of construing the logical relationship be-
tween the first Supreme Court opinion and the second one. One possi-
bility is that the case originally had a properly presented federal
question, albeit with a defective record, but that the Virginia court's
interim action on the remand did something that now "leaves" the
case devoid of a properly presented federal question. Another possi-
bility is that the case never did have a properly presented federal
question and that the Virginia court's interim action on the remand
did not do anything and thus "leaves" the case devoid of a properly
presented federal question. To be precise, this possibility assumes
that the Supreme Court dt first doubted whether a federal question
was properly presented, and so remanded to see if the record could
be improved. In light of the defiance, the Court re-examined its
doubts and determined with certainty that the case did not contain
a properly presented federal question.
We believe the second possibility to be more likely both because
350 U.S. 891 (1955).
7 350 U.S. 985 (1956). See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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it represents a more idiomatic use of the word "leaves" and because
it makes sense of the Rescue Army citation. In that case, Mr. Mur-
dock, an officer of the Rescue Army, wished to challenge the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance of Los Angeles that regulated the solicita-
tion of contributions for charity. Mr. Murdock had twice been prose-
cuted and convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles for alleged
violation of the ordinance. Both times, the conviction was reversed
by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, but reversed on
grounds that sent the case back to Municipal Court for a new trial.
Mr. Murdock, in an attempt to avoid a third trial, filed suit in the
District Court of Appeal and asked for a writ of prohibition against
the Municipal Court. The writ was denied, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the denial, and Mr. Murdock took an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that it
had jurisdication of the case, but it would decline to exercise that
jurisdiction, thus not deciding the constitutional issues raised by Mr.
Murdock.
Justice Rutledge's opinion discussed two problems. Since Mr.
Murdock was proceeding by wa:r of writ of prohibition, the technical
issue was the Municipal Court's power to proceed with the criminal
cause. The Municipal Court's power to proceed must be judged upon
the allegations made in the charges against Mr. Murdock and not
upon the allegations plus the evidence. "Hence only the validity of
the provisions on their face, not as applied to proven circumstances,
is called into question."78 Furthermore, it was not clear just how the
ordinance under which Murdock was charged should be construed;
Justice Rutledge devoted a major part, of his opinion to describing the
uncertainties in the ordinance.77
Murdock was challenging the constitutionality of a local ordi-
nance, but the. challenge was to the ordinance on its face, not as
applied, and the content of the ordinance was uncertain. Either of
these defects in the record of the Rescue Army case would have been
grounds for avoiding the constitutional issue. Justice Rutledge dis-
cussed the doctrines associated with Justice Brandeis' famous con-
curring opinion in the Ashwander case and argued at length that
these doctrines would lead to not deciding the issues tendered."
Given his co-authorship of The Federal Courts and The Federal
System-which stressed the importance of decisions like Rescue
Army-it seems appropriate to assume that Professor Wechsler
331 U.S. 549, 555 (1947).
Id. at 556-65, 575-83.
Id. at 568-75.
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would not argue that Justice Rutledge's opinion in Rescue Army was
"wholly without basis in the law," although he could properly argue
that the result in the case was wrong. Consequently, the sting of
Wechsler's criticism of Naim v. Naim can be significantly eased if
Naim can fairly be analogized to Rescue Army.
Of course, one important assumption is being made, and that is
that the Virginia court's defiance is not relevant. We are supposing,
with Wechsler, that one should judge the matter on neutral principles
and not on personalities. Furthermore, we are assuming that the
neutral principles at stake are not the principles that ought to govern
the Supreme Court's use of its contempt power. The question is not
whether the Supreme Court should have held the Virginia court to
be in contempt; it is rather, whether the appeal in Naim v. Naim
should have been dismissed.
The first question that is relevant is: what was the record before
the Supreme Court? In the Virginia Supreme Court there were four
documents: (1) the record of the proceedings below, (2) the petition
for appeal and the brief filed on behalf of Ham Say Naim, (3) the
amicus curiae brief of the Attorney-General of Virginia, and (4) a
reply brief. In the United States Supreme Court there were three
more documents: (5) statement as to jurisdiction filed on behalf of
Ham Say Naim, (6) statement of appellee opposing jurisdiction and
motion to dismiss or affirm, and (7) brief in opposition to appellee's
motion to dismiss or affirm. We shall take it for granted that (1) is
the document that the Court was referring to when it spoke of "the
record,""9 although that document might be supplemented by some
statements from the other documents.
Accepting the proposition that (1) is "the record," the first thing
that ought to be emphasized is that the record as printed is only seven
pages long. Page one reprints the Virginia Supreme Gourt of Appeals'
order awarding an appeal and inviting the Attorney-General to file
an amicus curiae brief. Page two and part of page three show Ruby's
complaint. The rest of page three, page four, and part of five show
Ham's answer. The decree is on page five. Pages six and seven reprint
the notice of appeal and the assignments of error.
Seven pages is a slim report. Moreover, pages one, six and seven
contain matter that relates solely to the appeal. Thus, the proceed-
ings at the trial are presented in only four pages. Eliminating the
running heads of the printed matter and a few other inessential typo-
' 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
1977] FEDERALISM AND SECURITIES REGULATION 817
graphical devices, pages two through five of the record read as fol-
lows:8"
[BILL OF COMPLAINT]
Your complainant, Ruby Elaine Naim, respectfully represents:
1. That she was married to Ham Say Naim on the 26th day
of June, 1952, in Elizabeth City, North Carolina.
2. That your complainant is an actual bona fide resident of
and has been domiciled in the State of Virginia for more than
one year next preceding the commencement 6f this suit, and
now resides in the City of Portsmouth, Virginia; that the de-
fendant is a non-resident.
3. That your complainant is a member of the Caucasian race
and that the defendant is a member of the Malayan race.
4. That there were no children born of this marriage.
5. Your complainant alleges that the said marriage is void in
law.
6. Your complainant further alleges that the said defendant
committed adultery on the 7th and 8th days of September,
1952, with "Kay" on Mowbray Arch, in the City of Norfolk,
Virginia; that it has not been five years since said act of adul-
tery occurred, and that it was not committed by the procure-
ment or connivance of your complainant, and that your com-
plainant has not cohabited with the said defendant since
knowledge of the said acts of adultery.
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, your complainant
prays that the said marriage be declared null and void, and of
no effect, and if the evidence be insufficient, then that she be
granted a divorce from the bonds of matrimony.
RUBY ELAINE NAIM
By A. A. BANGEL, p.q.
of BANGEL, BANGEL & BANGEL
Law Building
Portsmouth, Virginia
Filed in the Clerk's Office the 30 day of September 1953.
Teste:
K. A. BAIN, JR., Clerk
DORIS V. MAJOR, D. C.
The standard re-prints of the briefs and records filed in the U.S. Supreme Court
do not include this case; the editors have excluded from their re-prints cases that were
dealt with summarily by memoranda. Since the record has significant historic value,
since it is essential to understanding the case, and since it is available in only a few
libraries, we have decided to quote generously from it.
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PLEAS, MOTION AND ANSWER OF DEFENDANT.
Comes now the defendant herein and makes the following pleas
to this Honorable Court:
I. Defendant alleges that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the Complainant herein.
1. Complainant is domiciled in and is a permanent resident
of Indianapolis, Indiana, and has maintained her place of per-
manent abode in said city and state at 513 North New Jersey
Avertue, Indianapolis, Indiana.
2. The physical presence of the complainant in the Common-
wealth of Virginia has been intermittent and transitory from
a period beginning on or before the 26th of June, 1952, and
continuing through the 23rd day of September.
3. That at the time that the Bill of Complaint was filed here-
in the Complainant was temporarily residing at 354 West York
Street, Norfolk, Virginia; she has never lived in the City of
Portsmouth.
4. Defendant is an alien seaman and is a native citizen of
China and is not domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
II. Defendant further alleges that the Bill in Equity is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law in that the Bill, as filed, contains
inconsistent causes of action which require the Complainant to
elect one remedy among two.
1. Complainant in Paragraph 5 of the Bill alleges that the
marriage herein is void in law, and in the prayer for relief, she
seeks an annulment.
2. Complainant in Paragraph 6 of the Bill alleges that the
defendant has committed adultery and in the prayer for relief,
she seeks an absolute divorce.
III. Defendant further alleges that insofar as the Bill is
deemed a Bill for Annulment it is insufficient as a matter of
law in that the said marriage is not void in law.
1. The said marriage was valid in the State of North Caro-
lina, the State in which the marriage was celebrated.
2. The provisions of the Code of Laws of Virginia which pro-
hibit marriage ceremonies between members of the Caucasian
race and those persons who are possessed with non-Caucasian
blood are not applicable to persons who do not enter into mar-
riage ceremonies within the Commonwealth of Virginia, or to
persons who are not domiciled in the Commonwealth, or to
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persons whose marital domicile is outside of the Common-
wealth of Virginia.
3. The aforesaid provisions of the Code of Laws of Virginia
which prohibit intermarriage between Caucasian and those
persons who are possessed with non-Caucasian blood, in so far
as the defendant may be held to be within the jurisdiction of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, are in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
WHEREFORE, upon the basis of each of the foregoing
pleas, the defendant demurs to the Bill herein and moves that
it be dismissed.
IV. For Answer to the Bill, defendant respectfully represents
to the Court as follows:
1. That the allegations in Paragraph 1 of the Bill are admit-
ted.
2. That the allegations in Paragraph 2 are denied, except that
defendant admits that he is a non-resident of the Common-
wealth of Virginia.
3. That the defendant is without knowledge as to the truth
of the allegations in Paragraph 3.
4. That the allegation in Paragraph 4 is admitted.
5. That the allegation in Paragraph 5 is a conclusion of law,
but to the extent that it is material, it is denied.
6. That the allegations in Paragraph 6 are denied.









This cause came on this day to be heard on the bill of
complaint, the defendant's answer, evidence heard in open
court, and argument of counsel for both parties.
It appearing to the court that the complainant is a member
of the Caucasian race and the defendant not of the white race,
and complainant is an actual bona fide resident of and domi-
ciled in the State of Virginia, and has been for more than one
year next preceding the commencement of this action, and was
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residing in this city at the time of the institution of this suit;
the defendant is a non-resident; that the parties left the State
of Virginia on the 26th day of June, 1952, for Elizabeth City,
North Carolina, to enter into a marriage, and immediately
returned to this State and lived together as husband and wife.
It is adjudged, ordered and decreed that the marriage of the
parties on June 26, 1952, in Elizabeth City, N.C., is void. That
defendant pay to Bangel, Bangel & Bangel an attorney's fee of
$200.00 and the costs of these proceedings.
Enter 2/19/54.
F.E.K.
The most conspicuous defect in this record, judging it as a vehicle
for raising constitutional issues, is that it does not set forth or sum-
marize in any way the "evidence heard in open court." The parties
agreed that Ruby and Ham were married in Elizabeth City, North
Carolina, one year and three months prior to the beginning of the
lawsuit, that Ham is not a resident of Virginia, and that there are no
children. There is a significant dispute as to Ruby's residence and as
to Ham's fidelity. The decree states that evidence was heard on these
matters, and the briefs corroborate this. However, although the de-
cree makes findings as to residence, it does not make any findings on
the alleged adultery. Furthermore, there is no recital of evidence on
which either the finding or lack of finding was made. The lack of
explanation of the finding on residence is particularly puzzling. The
trial court found that Ruby was a resident of Virginia and that Ham
was a non-resident, a finding that contrasts rather curiously with its
finding that Ham and Ruby had lived together as husband and wife
after they returned to Virginia from North Carolina. One way to
explain the contrast is to postulate desertion, but if that is true, then
why was desertion not alleged? Did the court adopt Ruby's allegation
about no cohabitation since the adultery? If so, why was there no
finding about the adultery?
It is difficult to be specific about the Virginia law of annulment
since there are very few cases. However, the leading Virginia case,
Pretlow v. Pretlow, which was cited in the Virginia court's opinion
in Naim v. Naim, contains the following language:
Divorce is the creature of statute; annulment rests within the
inherent power of equity, inherited by it from the ecclesiastical
courts of England. Fraud, particularly before consummation,
is within the reach of its long arm, and that power is not lost
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because other grounds are specifically mentioned in the stat-
ute.8'
In Pretlow, the particular fraud was that the wife married intending
at the time of the marriage to refuse sexual intercourse to her hus-
band. The husband sued to annul and the Supreme Court held that
he was entitled to a decree of annulment despite the fact that no such
grounds were mentioned in the statute. There is no way of knowing
the proper scope of the Pretlow case. Presumably there are other
types of fraud, aside from the type of fraud involved in that case, that
could be grounds for annulment. More significantly, there is the pos-
sibility that there might be grounds for annulment in equity aside
from fraud, since the Virginia court has never committed itself on
that question.
Before one criticizes the Supreme Court's action in Naim v. Naim,
one ought to consider the following possible scenario. Suppose. the
Supreme Court had said that the statute was unconstitutional and
vacated the decree of annulment granted below; Ruby then. went
back into the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth and filed a
second annulment lawsuit. Suppose the trial court then granted her
an annulment that was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. To some degree, the options that would be open to the
Supreme Court at that point would depend upon the opinion written
by the Virginia court. The Supreme Court of Virginia might have
written an opinion based upon the Pretlow doctrine and the general
power of equity to avoid marriages whenever the circumstances are
unusual enough.12 The Virginia Supreme Court might have said that
prejudice in Portsmouth, Virginia, was such that Ruby was unable
to have any friends, that people would not speak to her, and that her
life and her marriage had become intolerable, and noted the psychol-
ogical effect of such prejudice upon Ruby's self esteem and her ability
to be a good wife, and concluded that the marriage had now become
a marriage in name only and should therefore be dissolved.
We need not suppose that any such opinion would be written in
1' Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524, 548-49, 14 S.E.2d 381, 387 (1941). The Virginia
opinion rests in part on a dictum by a former judge of that court, Martin P. Burks, in
Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316 (1923). The citation is significant to
a Virginia lawyer. The learned judge wrote a book known as BURKS' PLEADING AND
PRACTICE; young lawyers were formerly instructed by their elders at bar that if there
was a conflict between BURKS' PLEADING AND PRACTICE and the Virginia statutes, then
they were to follow Burks.
R2 The Pretlow case was cited in the Virginia court's first Naim v. Naim opinion.
197 Va. 80, 82, 87 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1955).
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good faith, but we ought to consider the fact that such an opinion
could have been written, and that the Supreme Court would then
have been forced into the position of holding whether Ruby Elaine
Naim and Ham Say Naim must stay married. So long as the contin-
uation of the marriage was not constitutionally required, the Rescue
Army and Ashwander citations are correct in the sense that they
embody the applicable rules of law.
At this point, the reader might protest that Rescue Army and
Ashwander are distinguishable. Indeed, they are. In Rescue Army,
however, Justice Rutledge noted that the constitutional question pre-
sented there was the ordinance as judged on its face rather than as
applied, and given the lack of facts in the Naim record, one could
make the same observations about that appeal. Furthermore, in
Rescue Army, Justice Rutledge said that there was uncertainty as to
how the ordinance should be construed; in Naim, there was uncer-
tainty as to Virginia's law about annulment that might be relevant
to the disposition of the case. Finally, as our hypothetical indicates,
it is true in Naim that, as Justice Brandeis noted in Ashwander,3
alternative grounds for decision could transform a constitutional rul-
ing into an advisory opinion.
It might be argued that the Supreme Court nevertheless was com-
pelled to act because Naim had no further official recourse in connec-
tion with the recovery of the wife he had lost. In other words, one
could argue that Rescue Army should be distinguished because in
that case the Supreme Court's judgment left the way open for another
trial, at which Mr. Murdock could present his constitutional claims,
while in Naim the Supreme Court's judgment ended the proceeding.
This proposed distinction must be assessed in light of the petition for
appeal filed on Ham Say Naim's behalf in the Virginia court, docu-
ment #2 of the list set forth supra. Pages 2-3 of that petition contain
the following:
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A hearing on the Bill, Motions, and Answer was held on
February 19, 1954, in the Circuit Court of the City of Ports-
mouth. After hearing testimony in extenso as to the domicile
and residence of the parties, their races, and the marriage and
the allegations of adultery as to both parties, the Court heard
oral argument upon the Appellee's prayer for a decree of annul-
297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936).
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ment upon the grounds that the parties were residents of Vir-
ginia at the time of their marriage, and that as such residents
their marriage was in contravention of Sections 54 and 58,
Title 20 of the Code of Laws of Virginia.
Appellant opposed the entry of a decree of annulment and
moved to dismiss it upon the following grounds:
That Section 54, Title 20 of the Code is in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States; That the Court, as an instrumentality of the State of
Virginia is constitutionally, upon the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment, without power to annul the marriage of the par-
ties upon the basis of race; That Section 58, Title 20 of the
Code is inapplicable to defendant in view of the evidence that
he is a citizen of China and is present in the United States only
as a non-immigrant seaman; That the marriage between the
parties was valid in North Carolina and is required to be given
full faith and credit by the Constitution of the United States;
That the definition of "white person" in the statute is so vague
as to render the statute void; That the statute is in conflict
with and is superseded by the Immigration Treaties concluded
between the United States and China; That the complainant
has failed to establish that she was a "white person" within the
meaning of the statute.
The trial court overruled appellant's motion, of which ex-
ception was noted, and entered a decree annulling the mar-
riage.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In this petition for appeal, the appellant assigns the follow-
ing errors:
1. In failing to hold that the Circuit Court of the City of
Portsmouth, as an instrumentality of the State of Virginia, is
constitutionally without the power to annul the marriage of the
parties herein upon the basis of race.
2. In failing to hold that the provisions of the Code of Laws
of Virginia which make it unlawful for any white person in the
State of Virginia to marry any save a white person are in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
Appellant abandons all other assignments of error hitherto
noted.
Once again, the discussion of the testimony tantalizes rather than
satisfies, this time with the possibility that there was mutual adul-
tery. The petition reveals, moreover, that Ham's lawyer abandoned
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other issues raised by the case and limited his appeal to an attack
on the anti-miscegenation statute, despite the fact that such issues
might have raised substantial federal questions. 4 Aside from the pro-
cedural complexities, Naim is not the best case on the merits for
considering the constitutionality of an anti-miscegenation statute,
since the case is a civil lawsuit, rather than a criminal action filed
by the state. The more recent Loving decision, 5 in which Virginia's
application of criminal sanctions against an interracial marriage was
held unconstitutional, is distinguishable, since the constitutional
issue presented by a statute that gives power to the state to avoid a
marriage on some particular ground that is unconstitutional may not
squarely be presented by a statute that gives the very same power to
an individual in connection with his own marriage. The distinction
we would draw between Naim and Loving is identical to that on the
basis of which Wechsler found the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer6
to be unprincipled:
Assuming that the Constitution speaks to state discrimina-
tion on the grounds of race but not to such discrimination by
an individual even in the use or distribution of his property,
although his freedom may no doubt be limited by common law
or statute, why is the enforcement of the private covenant a
state discrimination rather than a legal recognition of the free-
dom of the individual.
8 7
Admittedly, neither the Virginia court nor the Virginia legislature
have made this distinction between the state and the individual.
Suppose, however, that the distinction is made. Suppose that a man
and a woman of different races become husband and wife. Suppose
then that one of them discovers that he or she is a bigot. (Perhaps
one of them has repressed that ugly fact about his or her psyche; or
it may be that what one of them has repressed is how vulnerable one
can be to the pressures of a community.) A divorce could be granted
if the parties appeared before a court where incompatibility is recog-
nized as a legitimate grounds for divorce." Should it be different if
8 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); U.S. v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941); New York City v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), rev'd, Henderson v.
New York City, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'7 Wechsler, supra note 58, at 29.
Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364, 211 N.E.2d 817 (1965). This
case is an annulment case, so the result would be a fortiori for an incompatibility
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the state, through its courts or its legislature, declares this particular
sort of incompatibility to be a ground for ending a marriage without
so providing for incompatibility in general? That the answer to this
question is Yes seems to us to be the meaning of the precedent of
Shelley v. Kraemer.
V.
This distinction proposed as fundamental to the application of
Shelley v. Kraemer is grounded in the view that the meaning of
Brown v. Board of Education was a judicial recognition of the histori-
cal need to admit blacks into the United States community on equal
terms, to overcome the legacy of the Supreme Court decision in Dred
Scott as to "whether the facts stated in the plea are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the
United States": "
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors
were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a
member of the political community formed and brought into
existence by the Constitution of the United States .... 1
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories 6f
the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, show that neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the
people, nor intended to be included in the general words used
in that memorable instrument."
[Tihe men who framed this declaration were great
men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of
honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with
those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood
divorce. In Kober, the defendant-husband, who had been a member of the Nazi party
and an officer in the German Army in WW H, was fanatically anti-Semitic and ap-
proved of the attempt at genocide of the Jews. During courtship, he concealed his
prejudice and associated amiably with his prospective wife's Jewish friends. After
marriage, he revealed this prejudice and ordered her to cease associating with Jews.
Note that there was no allegation that the wife-plaintiff was herself a Jew, and the
comment in 35 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 125 (1966) indicates that she was not.
" Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 402 (1857).
"Id. at 403.
"1 Id. at 407.
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the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be
understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any
part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro
race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civi-
lized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to
slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then estab-
lished doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language
of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy
black race were separated from the white by indelible marks,
and laws long before established, and were never thought of or
spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner
or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.92
If our view of Brown is accepted, the legal justification for the
Shelley decision rests on the Court's explicit statement that "[t]he
parties have directed our attention to no case in which a court, state
or federal, has been called upon to enforce a covenant excluding
members of the white majority from ownership or occupancy of real
property on grounds of race or color."93 It could, of course, be claimed
that once it is agreed that the court whose action is being reviewed
would, in fact, enforce such a covenant, it denies equal protection of
the laws to force a party to bear the burden of creating the situation
in which such enforcement would take place. That the fact of the
existing historical context is a sufficient basis on which to reject such
a claim is what the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Reitman v. Mulkey. 4 That decision affirmed the action of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court invalidating a state constitutional amendment
providing in part that: "Neither the State nor any. . . agency thereof
shall . . .limit . . . the right of any person . . .to decline to sell,
lease, or rent . . .property . . .as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses." As the dissent in the United States Supreme Court noted:
The only "factual" matter relied on by the majority of the
California Supreme Court was the context in which Proposi-
tion 14 was adopted, namely, that several strong antidiscrimi-
nation acts had been passed by the legislature and opposed by
many of those who successfully led the movement for adoption
of Proposition 14 by popular referendum. These circumstan-
ces, and these alone, the California court held, made [the
" Id. at 410.
,3 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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resulting constitutional provision] unlawful under this Court's
cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. 5
Our contention is not that reliance on historical context is neutral
in adjudicating between the contending parties; only that it is at
times necessary in the process of making law for a diverse and rapidly
changing society.
In upholding the application of Massachusetts' child labor laws
to Jehovah's Witnesses, Justice Rutledge articulated the pressures
compelling resort to history in adjudicating claims for exemption
from secular laws under the Free Exercise Clause:
To make accommodation between religious freedoms and
an exercise of state authority always is delicate. It hardly could
be more so than in such a clash as this case presents. On one
side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience
and religious practice. With it is allied the parent's claim to
authority in her own household and in the rearing of her chil-
dren. The parent's conflict with the state over control of the
child and his training is serious enough when only secular mat-
ters are concerned. It b6comes the more so when an element
of religious conviction enters. Against these sacred private in-
terests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to
protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of
authority to that end, made here in a manner conceded valid
if only secular things were involved. The last is no mere corpo-
rate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth
itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safe-
guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Be-
tween contrary pulls of such weight, the safest and most objec-
tive recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely
but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this
battle has gone on."
Because of the need for government to remain neutral between
secularism as an ideology and religion, however, even reliance on
historical context is often insufficient to overcome the difficulties
involved in formulating a consistent pattern of decision. As Justice
Jackson noted in the decision denying exemption from Massachu-
setts' child labor laws:
, 387 U.S. 369, 391 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
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The novel feature of this decision is this: the Court holds
that a state may apply child labor laws to restrict or prohibit
an activity of which, as recently as last term, it held: "This
form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under
the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection
as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion."
"[T]he mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by
itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform
evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the
passing of the collection plate in church would make the
church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights
of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken
and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing
retailers or wholesalers of books." Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105, 109, 111.
It is difficult for me to believe that going upon the streets
to accost the public is the same thing for application of public
law as withdrawing to a private structure for religious worship.
But if worship in the churches and the activity of Jehovah's
Witnesses on the streets "occupy the same high estate" and
have the "same claim to protection" it would seem that child
labor laws may be applied to both if to either. If the Murdock
doctrine stands along with today's decision, a foundation is
laid for any state intervention in the indoctrination and partic-
ipation of children in religion, provided it is done in the name
of their health or welfare.
My own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin
to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with
liberties of others or of the public. Religious activities which
concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as
nearly absolutely free as anything can be. But beyond these,
many religious denominations or sects engage in collateral and
secular activities intended to obtain means from unbelievers to
sustain the worshippers and their leaders. They raise money,
not merely by passing the plate to those who voluntarily attend
services or by contributions by their own people, but by solici-
tations and drives addressed to the public by holding public
dinners and entertainments, by various kinds of sales and
Bingo games and lotteries. All such money-raising activities on
a public scale are, I think, Caesar's affairs and may be regu-
lated by the state so long as it does not discriminate against
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one because he is doing them for a religious purpose, and the
regulation is not arbitrary and capricious, in violation of other
provisions of the Constitution."
The difficulty involved in ascertaining when something
"concerns" non-members of a given sect, when a given denomination
is legitimately perceived as threatening by the society in which it
exists, is demonstrated in connection with the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, both by Reynolds v. United States,98 which
refused to grant exemptions from laws against polygamy on free exer-
cise grounds, and by Mormon Church v. United States,9 which up-
held Congressional legislation seizing the property of the church. And
the number and diversity of opinions in Wolman v. Walter' under-
line the extent to which the "wall of separation" erected between
church and state by the spending prohibition embodied in the Estab-
lishment Clause constitutes, today, "a blurred, indistinct, and varia-
ble barrier."'01 Given that situation, it seems noteworthy that the
Warren Court opinion that constituted a significant expansion of
federal taxpayer's standing in connection with government spending
occurred in a case raising precisely such issues.0 2
VI.
Justice Marshall summarized the basis for his dissent from the
Burger Court's opinion in Beal v. Doe'03 in the following terms"
When this Court decided Roe v. Wade. . .it properly em-
barked on a course of constitutional adjudication no less con-
troversial than that begun by Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The abortion decisions are sound law and
undoubtedly good policy. They have never been questioned by
the Court and we are told that today's cases "signal[ ] no
retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. .. ." The logic of
those cases inexorably requires invalidation of the present en-
actments. Yet I fear that the Court's decisions will be an invi-
tation to public officials, already under extraordinary pressure
Id. at 176-78.
" 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
" 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
"' 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
,' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
" 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
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from well financed and carefully orchestrated lobbying cam-
paigns, to approve more such restrictions. The effect will be to
relegate millions of people to lives of poverty and despair.
When elected leaders cower before public pressure, this Court,
more than ever, must not shirk its duty to enforce the Consti-
tution for the benefit of the poor and powerless.' 4
The interpretation of Wade given in the majority opinion focuses
on an interest strikingly similar to the one the Court postulated as
the basis for Massachusetts' child labor laws: 105
As we acknowledged in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
the State has a valid and important interest in encouraging
childbirth. We expressly recognized in Roe the "important and
legitimate interest [of the State] in protecting the potential-
ity of human life." Id., at 162.106
The holding in Beal v. Doe, moreover, was explicitly presented as
one based on textual analysis:
The only question before us is one of statutory construction:
whether [the Social Security Act] requires Pennsylvania to
fund under its medicaid program the cost of all abortions that
are permissible under state law. "The starting-point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring). 7
Respondents point to nothing in either the language or the
legislative history of Title XIX [of the Social Security Act]
that suggests that it is unreasonable for a participating State
to further [its] unquestionably strong and legitimate interest
in encouraging normal childbirth. Absent such a showing, we
will presume that Congress intended to condition a State's
participation in the Medicaid Program on its willingness to
undercut this important interest by subsidizing the costs of
nontherapeutic abortions.' 8
The claims that no conflict with Roe v. Wade existed, that the
logic of precedent did not "inexorably require" invalidation of the
,' Id. at 2398 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
,o See text accompanying note 96 supra.
100 97 S. Ct. 2395, 2371 (1977).
Id. at 2370.
"0 Id. at 2372 (footnotes omitted).
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state and local enactments under review, were made in Maher v.
Roe'°9 in terms of a distinction that was explicitly invoked forty years
earlier in upholding Title IX of the Social Security Act against the
charge that it "involv[ed] the coercion of the states in contravention
of the Tenth Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal
form of government."", What Maher v. Roe argued was that: "There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the
State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power
to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily
far broader.""' And the earlier opinion rejected the Tenth Amend-
ment argument on the basis that "to hold that motive or temptation
is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.
The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical
determinism by which-choice becomes impossible.. . . We do not fix
the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that wherever the
line may be, this statute is within it. Definition more precise must
abide the wisdom of the future."
112
As this argument makes explicit, the difficulty facing the judicial
process has its roots, not only in the federal nature of the political
structure, but also in the lack of clarity that necessarily results from
"assum[ing] the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis", 3
from attempting to formulate logically consistent patterns of law that
nevertheless remain relatively impervious to manipulation. The basis
for this lack of clarity in connection with the work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission was delineated by the author of the law
review article cited in. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, "I in an
opinion written while he was serving as chairman of that agency in
1964. Discussing the question whether "disclosure [could] be re-
quired in a prospectus regarding the adequacy of performance of
managerial functions by registrant's board of directors,""' he noted
that "outright fraud or reckless indifference by directors might be
readily identifiable and universally condemned. But activity short of
' 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
"' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937).
97 S. Ct. at 2383.
'' Steward Machine Co: v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90, 591 (1937).
,, Id. at 590.
' See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
,, In the Matter of Franchard Corporation (Formerly Glockman Corporation)
Securities Act. Rel. No. 4710, 42 S.E.C. 163, 175 (1964).
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that, which may give rise to legal restraints and liabilities, invokes
significant uncertainty,""' 6 and that "[t]o be sure, we have required
disclosures concerning particular transactions which have raised
questions of non-compliance with state or federal law governing busi-
ness conduct. . . . But the disclosures sought here . . . would either
result in self-serving generalities of little value to investors or grave
uncertainties both on the part of those who must enforce and those
who must comply with [the Securities] Act."" 7
Beyond question, however, the political structure of federalism
-the existence of competing political authorities-considerably
exacerbates these difficulties in many areas of the law. With states,
as with religious sects, it is the fact of competing power centers and
the resultant diversity that requires the making of value choices that
are not "neutral," in the sense that they have necessary substantive
consequences rather than being capable of being rationalized solely
in terms of process.
In Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,"8 which involved
ecclesiastical proceedings against a church official growing out of
several attempted administrative reorganizations of church organiza-
tions and property, Mr. Justice White made precisely such a substan-
tive holding when he concurred in Mr. Justice Brennan's majority
opinion solely on the basis that "[m]ajor predicates for the Court's
opinion are that the Serbian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical
church and the American and Canadian Diocese, involved here, is
part of that church.""' 9 As Mr. Justice Rehnquist put it in dissent:'20
There is nothing in this record to indicate that the Illinois
courts have been instruments of any. . . impermissible intru-
sion by the State on one side or the other of a religious dis-
pute. . . . Instead, [the Supreme Court of Illinois'] opinion
appears to be precisely what it purports to be: an application
of neutral principles of law consistent with the decisions of the
Court. Indeed, petitioners make absolutely no claim to the
contrary. They agree that the Illinois courts should have de-
cided the issues which they presented; but they contend that
in doing so those courts should have deferred entirely to the
representations of the announced representatives of Mother
16 Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Id. at 725.
220 Mr. Justice Stevens joined in the dissent. Id.
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Church .... To make available the coercive powers of civil
courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical
religious associations, when such deference is not accorded
similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoid-
ing the Free Exercise problems petitioners envision, itself cre-
ate far more serious problems under the Establishment
Clause.'
If it is accepted that the Supreme Court has no alternative to the
making of value choices, one way of stating the task facing the Burger
Court is its need to make acceptable society's recognition that the
ambiguous value choice in favor of equality embodied in Brown v.
Board of Education is being explicitly restricted to the entry of mi-
nority groups into the community on equal terms. Many of the War-
ren Court decisions, although enunciated in more limited terms,
could justifiably have been construed as entailing a considerably
broader commitment to the ideal of individual equality. In the field
of criminal law, for example, Escobedo v. Illinois'2 was phrased in
terms of sixth amendment guarantees and Miranda v. Arizona'23 was
couched in fifth amendment language. Escobedo, however, relied on
the "lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or
should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued 'effectiveness
on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitu-
tional rights,"'2 4 and, it therefore appears what Escobedo and
Miranda could be read to postulate was the duty to equalize, between
those who are aware of their constitutional rights and those who are
not, the opportunity for access to counsel prior to interrogation that
may result in invocation of fifth amendment rights.
In Brewer v. Williams,-2 the Burger Court explicitly refused "to
review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, . . .a doctrine
designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.' 2 Brewer had been warned both by his own law-
yer and by the lawyer at his arraignment not to make statements
until after consulting with his lawyer, located in another city. As one
of the concurrences in the Court's opinion noted:
As the dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice sharply illus-
121 426 U.S. 696, 733-34 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
'2 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
121 Id.. at 1239.
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trates, resolution of the issues in this case turns primarily on
one's perception of the facts. There is little difference of opin-
ion, among the several courts (and numerous judges) who have
reviewed the case, as to the relevant constitutional principles
The critical factual issue is whether there had been a volun-
tary waiver, and this turns in large part upon whether there
was interrogation [during the automobile ride to the city in
which his lawyer was located].'2
The Iowa Supreme Court had affirmed the state trial court's de-
termination of waiver, but lower federal courts, in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, granted a new trial on the basis that "the issue
of waiver was not one of fact but of federal law [and] that the Iowa
courts had 'applied the wrong constitutional standards' in ruling that
Williams had waived the protections that were his under the Consti-
tution."'2
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the lower fed-
eral courts on the basis that "[t]he circumstances of this case are
. . . constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in
Massiah v. United States [377 U.S. 201 (1964)] . . . the clear rule
of [which] is that once adversary proceedings have commenced
against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the
government interrogates him."'' 2 Mr. Justice White dissented:,"
"[Tihe issue is, as the majority recognizes, one of the proof neces-
sary to establish waiver. If an intentional relinquishment of the right
to counsel under Miranda is established by proof that the accused
was informed of his right and then voluntarily answered questions in
counsel's absence, then similar proof establishes an intentional relin-
quishment of the Massiah right to counsel.'
'3 1
Given the dissent's analysis of the bearing of the Massiah preced-
ent on the situation before the Court, it seems clear that the major-
ity's focus on the fact that "adversary proceedings have commenced
against an individual," while it may constitute a holding based on
operational categories for the lawyer, is of only formal significance to
the layman. If the choice made by the Court is a legitimate one,
however, it will be so, not because of the mode of analysis in terms
' Id. at 1245 (Powell, J. concurring).
i2 Id. at 1241.
121 Id. at 1240 (footnote omitted).
" Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
1 97 S. Ct. at 1258 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
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of which it was derived, but because its substantive content focuses
on a time when the relevant actor (the policeman to whom the in-
criminating statements were made) can be perceived as representing
the government rather than as acing in his individual capacity-a
distinction that we have argued explicates the meaning of the Shelley
v. Kraemer precedent.'
Whatever one's views concerning the decisions of the Warren
Court, the Burger Court's response to them has been such as to make
possible a new strategy in securities litigation. Securities lawyers
have habitually analyzed issues in terms of the dichotomy that the
issue is governed either by state corporate or federal securities law.
We would like to suggest that there is a tertium quid: the issue is
governed by state corporate law, but the content of state corporate
law is limited by federal securities law. Thus, the restrictive conven-
ant involved in Shelley v.Kraemer is governed by state property law,
but the permissible content of the state property law is limited by
that decision. If the content of the state real property law can be
limited by federal constitutional law, why can't the content of the
state substantive law of corporations be limited by federal securities
law? Although we cannot predict the Burger Court's response to this
strategy, it would seem to fit well with the Court's approach to other
issues in that federal policy would be made obligatory upon the states
without any transfer of jurisdiction to the federal courts.
'2 See text accompanying note 88 supra. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945). For a denial of an analogous distinction, see text accompanying note 34
supra.

